The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “thirders” and “halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. We also explore what fair prices Sleeping Beauty computes for gambles that she might be offered during the experiment.
Joint work with Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Rafael Stern
- Speaker: Mark Schervisch (CMU)
- Friday 03 February 2017, 16:00–17:00
- Venue: MR12, Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge..
- Series: Statistics; organiser: Quentin Berthet.